We propose an approach for analysing trends in the contributions of social groups to electoral coalitions, and apply this approach to an analysis of the impact of changes in the race, religion, class, and gender cleavages on coalitions in U.S. Presidential elections between 1960 and 1992. We improve on existing studies of party coalitions by developing a multivariate model that measures group-specific political alignments while also correcting for changes in group size and turnout rates. Our analyses show that there have been significant changes in the contributions of different social groups to major party coalitions: the Democrats now receive more votes from professionals (and to a lesser extent, managers), blacks, and non-religious persons, and fewer votes from working-class voters; the Republican coalition has gained among managers (and to a lesser extent, professionals), while losing out significantly among liberal Protestants, blacks, and non-working voters. The analyses provide evidence of a slight convergence amidst a larger pattern of enduring group-based differences within the Democratic and Republican coalitions. The approach developed here can readily be extended to study electoral coalitions in other national contexts.
Introduction
It has long been theorized that electoral coalitions in capitalist democracies have distinctive sociodemographic profiles, and that those profiles influence the political strategies and policy agendas of political parties (Tingsten, 1937; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986) . Indeed, a central topic in the classical political sociology of the postwar era was the relationship between membership in socio-demographic groups and voting behaviour (Lipset, 1981 (Lipset, [1960 and Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Alford 1963) . This line of research explored how social divisions came to be translated into support for political parties, and whether the alignment of particular groups with particular parties was changing over time.
After the 1960s the sociological tradition of voting behaviour research largely disappeared (Franklin et al., \992a; Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993) . Voting studies increasingly turned to examinations of the more proximate sources of voting behaviour, such as partisanship, policy attitudes, or values (for a review, see Dalton, 1996) . Recently, however, a number of researchers have begun to re-examine the inter-relationship of social group memberships and political behaviour. The resurgence of interest in social cleavages as a source of vote choice (e.g. Brooks and Manza, 1997a; Heath et al., 1985; Heath et al., 1991; Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Evans, 1999) has made use of new theoretical concepts and powerful statistical techniques that significantly improve over the earlier generation of scholarship (for a review, see Manza et al., 1995) .
Recent research 1 has not for the most part sought to examine the actual impact of social group membership on the shape of the electoral coalitions of political parties.
2 This is due to their focus on the structural association of group membership with voting behaviour, rather than the consequences of social group alignments for election outcomes. This distinction reflects two different ways that social cleavages can be translated into political outcomes. The primary question examined in most recent studies is whether membership in a particular social group disposes one to favour a particular party's candidates. This is a structural question about group-specific political alignments, and it can be answered using margin-independent measures that do not take into account the relative size of a subgroup or its turnout rate. However, researchers also have an interest in knowing the extent to which a group's political behaviour has an impact on a party's chances in an election. Such questions about group impacts on party coalitions must be answered using margin-dependent measures (which do take into account sub-group size and turnout rates).
3 Investigating the causal impact of social group membership on party coalitions requires that we analyse not only the political alignment of specific social groups, but also -as the title of this paper indicate -the size of these groups within the electorate and their turnout rates.
In this paper we introduce an approach to measuring the impact of social group membership on party coalitions, and apply it to a study of presidential elections in the United States between 1960 and 1992. 4 Although our empirical focus is on U.S. national politics, the approach we develop here can readily be adopted for studying party coalitions in other democratic polities. 5 The paper is in four sections. In the first part of the paper we review existing research on party coalitions, and examine some of the methodological limitations of past studies of U.S. parties. The second part discusses problems relating to the impact of social group membership on party coalitions. Next we discuss the data and new measures used in the analyses, while the results of the analysis are presented in part four. The concluding section discusses the significance of our findings for understanding the social bases of U.S. party coalitions and the 'sociological' approach to political behaviour.
Past Research on Party Coalitions
Studies of social cleavages in American politics, as in other national contexts, have centred mostly on the structural association between group membership and voter alignments. When researchers have examined the impact on party coalitions, it has mostly been in studies of party identification, not voting (e.g. Knoke, 1976; Petrocik, 1981 Petrocik, , 1987 Carmines and Stanley, 1992; Niemi, 1993,1995; Flanigan and Zingale, 1994: chap. 5) . While informative in their own right, studies of the social bases of party identification have important limits for understanding group contributions to election outcomes (and defacto electoral coalitions). 6 The regular surveys by Axelrod (e.g. 1972 Axelrod (e.g. ,1986 and Abramson, etal. (e.g. 1994: chap. 5 ) have provided the most comprehensive portraits of social group contributions to party coalitions in presidential elections. Axelrod's analyses found declining support among Catholics, Southerners, and union households for Democratic presidential candidates from the 1950s to the 1970s, while Abramson etal. argue that with the exception of race, political divisions among all of the social groups they examine (class, religion, region, and union membership) have narrowed over the same period. However, both Axelrod and Abramson etal. use bivariate measures that do not permit them to assess the consequences of particular group memberships net of other group memberships. This methodological limitation reflects a flawed conceptualization of the nature of social cleavages, given the multiple group memberships of all voters and also the overlapping nature of many cleavages (see Brooks and Manza, 1997a) . Equally important, Abramson et al. do not evaluate the impact of over-time changes in the size or turnout rates of the relevant groups. Finally, their bivariate measures do not distinguish changes in voting patterns that affect all groups equally from those that reflect group-specific consequences (see Manza et al., 1995) .
The only studies of which we are aware that employ a multivariate approach to examining social group voting alignments over an extended historical period are those of Erikson, et al. (1989) , 7 who develop an analysis of social groups and presidential voting in the United States between 1952 and 1984. Their key innovation is to use a statistical model that distinguishes group-specific from electorate-wide shifts. They also control for the size of the different groups they examine. Their results suggest that with the exception of Southern whites, the decline in Democratic fortunes can best be understood not as a decay of the old coalition, but as a general decline in Democratic voting among all groups (Erikson et al., 1989: 344) .
However, Erikson et al. employ dichotomous (or in the case of religion, trichotomous) measures of key social cleavages. We argue (in more detail below) that such measures are inadequate because they conceal much of the over-time changes in the size of the groups comprising each of the major social cleavages in American politics. Moreover, when making calculations about the impact of subgroup size, almost all existing research has relied entirely on sample proportions derived from the American National Election Study (ANES) surveys. The ANES sample proportions, however, reflect the over-representation of some social groups, making it advantageous to introduce Corrections based on national census data to develop more accurate estimates of the impact of changes in group size on party coalitions. Finally, few studies (including those of Erikson etal) have adjusted their estimates to take into account group differences in voter turnout rates (and changes over-time). For a polity characterized by widely divergent turnout rates among different groups of voters, this may be an especially important limitation.
Theorizing the Impact of Social Groups on Party Coalitions
In this study, we consider the contributions to party coalitions from the sub-groups comprising four major social cleavages in the American political system: race, religion, class, and gender. Our analyses measure three sources of influence that shape the impact of group membership on party coalitions: 1. the tendency of a group to be aligned with a major party; 2. the size of each group; and 3. the likelihood that group members will turn out to vote. In this section, we present the theoretical concepts underlying these analyses, discussing how they represent an advance over past approaches to understanding party coalitions. We then discuss the four cleavages that define the social groups in our analysis, outlining our conceptualization of group membership and the main reasons why we can expect change in their alignment, size, and turnout to have influenced the shape of major party coalitions.
Three Factors Governing the Impact of Social Groups on Party Coalitions
Our approach to understanding the linkages between social groups and party coalitions starts from four basic premises. Two are common in previous studies and two are novel. These premises provide a systematic theoretical basis for our analysis, identifying three key factors that govern the impact of social groups on party coalitions.
First, we conceptualize party coalitions as pertaining to voting and election outcomes (rather than party identification). Ultimately, it is at the ballot box that electoral coalitions are formed. Second, understanding group-specific shifts in alignment requires the use of multivariate models that distinguish between electorate-wide and group-specific changes in vote choice (or what Heath et al. (1985 Heath et al. ( , 1991 refer to as 'relative' measures of group political alignments). Group-specific alignments are a key factor governing the presence of a group within party coalitions, and we use multivariate models to calculate the group-specific probabilities of favouring the Democratic or Republican Party in a particular election.
Third, we emphasize the importance of the size of groups within a party's coalition. Group size is independent of a groups political alignment. For instance, a relatively small group (such as Jewish voters in the U.S. case) can have an exceptionally strong political alignment with one party, but the actual contribution of a group also depends on the number of its members. This means that for large groups (such as women voters), even small shifts in alignment can have a significant impact on party coalitions. The importance of group size is especially significant given the long historical period covered by these analyses, during which time a number of key groups -such as liberal Protestants, professionals, and managers -have undergone significant changes in their size relative to other groups in the electorate.
Finally, we emphasize that the rate of voter turnout among a social group mediates its impact on party coalitions. For instance, the impact of large groups can be limited by low turnout rates, and vice versa for smaller groups. In general, this means that understanding the impact of group size requires that we conceptualize it as a proportion of actual voters within the electorate (rather than as a proportion of all eligible voters or the population as a whole).
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Conceptualizing Social Cleavages
Our focus in this study is on the race, religious, class, and gender cleavages. These four cleavages are all 1. grounded in social structural divisions; 2. find expression in the normative conflicts in American society; and 3. are embedded in the organizational forms of the major parties and political institutions. Other prospective cleavages are either not properly understood as being rooted in social structure or have no direct representation in the normative conflicts or organizational forms of American politics to the same degree as the racial, religious, class, and gender cleavages. 
Race
The political evolution of the race cleavage has been the least controversial in voting research, with virtually all analysts acknowledging that the voting gap between Whites and African-Americans increased dramatically in the 1964 Goldwater-Johnson election, remaining largely unchanged since then (e.g. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989; Tate, 1993; Abramson et al., 1994: 144-147; Dawson, 1994) . African-Americans are unusual in consistently giving up to 85 per cent or more of their votes to one party (i.e. the Democrats), and this strong alignment results in their significant over-representation in the Democratic coalition.
10 Turnout differences and changes over time can also be expected to shape the impact of racial group membership on party coalitions. African-American turnout increased significantly with the long-delayed establishment of universal voting rights in the mid-1960s, but turnout rates among black voters have continued to lag significantly behind those of whites (though narrowing in the 1980s). Our analysis of racial groups within major party coalitions takes these changes in turnout into account.
Religion
The religious cleavage in U.S. politics is unusually complex and important, given Americans' comparatively high levels of religiosity (see e.g. Burnham, 1981:132-139; Tirakyian, 1993; Lipset, 1996) . Unlike race, there is considerable disagreement among scholars of religious politics over the political alignments of different religious groups. Additionally,-changes in size and (possibly) turnout confound this picture.
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Research on the religious political cleavage has produced contradictory findings. Modernization, Marxist, and 'postmaterialist'approaches assert that a religious influence on politics was one of the historic casualties of economic development and increasingly secular orientations in the mass public (see Yamanc, 1997 for a discussion of the recent debates over the 'secularization' thesis). Some scholars have indeed claimed to find evidence of declining religious divisions in presidential elections (e.g. Abramson et al., 1994: 156-158; Carmines and Stanley, 1992: 224) . Other scholars report little or no evidence of declining levels of religious voting (e.g. Greeley, 1989: chap. 7; Manza and Brooks, 1997) .
A second type of argument suggesting the decline of religious cleavages focuses on shifts among particular denominational groups. Of potential importance to party coalitions is the evidence that Catholic voters are shifting from Democratic Party stalwarts to a more centrist posture in recent elections (Petrocik, 1987; Kenski and Lockwood, 1991; Green and Guth, 1991) . Similarly, some scholars have claimed to find evidence that mainline Protestants are moving away from the Republican Party towards the centre (Lopatto, 1985; Kellstedt, 1994; Manza and Brooks, 1997) , a shift which would have similar consequences for the Republican coalition.
Another source of possible change in party coalitions can be seen in the emergence of a politically active Christian Right (CR). Viewed as drawing support from fundamentalist Protestant denominations, the growing prominence of the CR in recent Presidential elections has been seen as bringing about a repoliticization of the religious cleavage in the period since the late 1970s. Conservative Protestants are said to have shifted from an equivocal (or even pro-Democratic) orientation towards strong support for the Republican Party (Smidt, 1989; Noll, 1990, Green and Guth, 1991) . Any increase in turnout among conservative Protestants (e.g. Liebman, 1983) due to the CR mobilization would magnify the subsequent effects on party coalitions.
Class
Questions about the alignment of classes and parties have been contested. Most analyses of class divisions in American politics have claimed to find evidence of a declining significance of class divisions since the 1930s (e.g. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989; Piven, 1992; Clark eta/., 1993; Weakliem, 1997) . Applied to the study of party coalitions, declining significance models predict that voters from all classes are likely to be increasingly similar in their vote choice, and hence that the class profiles of the parties should become increasingly similar. Other analysts have disagreed with such conclusions, reporting little or no evidence of declining class divisions in this period (Halle and Romo, 1991; Houteta/., 1995; Brooks and Manza, 1997*) .
Two other issues debated in the literature on class politics are relevant for understanding the sources of change in party coalitions. First, a number of analysts have asserted that turnout among poor and working-class voters has fallen off faster than that of middle-class voters since the 1960s (Burnham, 1987; Piven and Cloward, 1988) . Second, the widely-discussed'shift from manufacturing to services and other postindustrial trends have reduced the relative size of the working-class vote. These trends should reduce the overall impact of working-class votes within both party coalitions. However, the existence of these trends has been contested. Some analysts have found little or no evidence of class-specific dealignment (see e.g. Leigley and Nagler, 1992; HoutetaL, 1995) . Further, the unusual American pattern of postindustrial development has included the expansion of proletarianized service-sector labour markets alongside the simultaneous growth of professional and managerial positions (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1992) .
Gender
The appearance of a 'gender gap' in recent U.S. presidential elections, in which women voters have given greater support to Democratic presidential candidates than men, has been the subject of considerable commentary (Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Klein, 1984; Mueller, 1988; Manza and Brooks, 1998) . The existence of a small but growing gender gap in both presidential and congressional elections has been found by researchers working with different surveys, and its existence is by now largely uncontroversial. The significance of the gender gap for electoral coalitions is potentially magnified by the steadily increasing turnout of women voters since the 1950s (Firebaugh and Chen, 1995) . Women voters should thus be more Democratic and they may also increasingly represent a more significant part of the total electorate. As with race, the main question of interest in the current study is how such changes in alignments and turnout may have affected the major party coalitions.
Data and Measures
Data
We analyse data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) for presidential elections from between 1960 and 1992. The ANES is the premier source of voting data in the U.S. and contains the items necessary to measure the racial, religious, class, and gender-based political cleavages, as well as additional covariates. The ANES is carried out during both presidential and congressional elections, but to keep the paper manageable we limit our analysis here to presidential elections, and specifically, to the choice of major party (i.e. Democratic or Republican) candidates. 12 We use logistic regression models to analyse two dependent variables as a means of developing estimates of groups-specific political alignments (coded '1' for the Democratic and '0' for the Republican candidate) and turnout rates (coded '1' if a respondent reports voting and '0'otherwise). We then calculate the predicted probabilities for the groups in our analyses to estimate their impact on the major party coalitions in the 1960-1992 period (our measures of these effects are discussed below).
Because of significant limitations in the coding of the religion variable prior to 1960 (in which all Protestant denominations were lumped together in a single, undifferentiated category), our analyses begin with the 1960 elections. However, since many of the changes hypothesized as affecting the impact of social groups on party coalitions are said to have occurred since 1960, this limitation is largely irrelevant for our purposes.
Changes in Group Size
To properly estimate the effects of changes relating to each of the groups we examine, it is necessary to include in the analyses adjustments for the (variable) size of the groups over time. Because of the wellestablished over-representation of some groups of voters in the ANES time series 13 and the underrepresentation of others (see e.g. Hout et at., 1994) -errors which should not affect our estimates of group differences in vote choice or turnout -we have relied on U.S. Census Bureau data for information about the size of the race, gender, and class categories.
14 The census data also address the problem of over-time sample variability in group size, a problem that is especially relevant for groups such as African-Americans, for whom a few percentage points shift in size between elections can result in biased estimates of their representation within party coalitions. For the religion variable, however, we rely on the ANES sample proportions, since the Census Bureau does not collect information on religion. We note, however, that the ANES survey data appear to track the basic denominational trends found in other representative national surveys. Table 1 summarizes the size of the major social groups for each election year in the analyses. 'Gender'and 'race'are coded as dichotomies (women = 1, African-Americans = 1). The univariate distribution of these two variables changed by one or two percentage points between 1960 and 1992, but recall that their relative size amongst the voting public also depends on their turnout rates for a given election. In addition to the social cleavage variables (we discuss class and religion in more detail below), we also include controls for age, education, and region in the multivariate analyses. Age is measured as a continuous variable (in years). "Education' is a continuous variable, also measured in years, for the last year of school attended. Region is a dichotomy, coded '1' for South, and '0' otherwise. We also use a dummy variable for birth cohort (coded '1' for the pre-enfranchisement generation, and '0'otherwise), to analyse the impact of changes in women's voter turnout.
Because of the multi-category schemes we employ, our operationalization of the'class'and 'religion' variables requires some additional explication. Following recent work on class voting (Heath eta/., 1985; Houteta/., 1995; Brooks and Manza, 1997*) , we distinguish six class categories, as follows:
• Professionals (both salaried and self-employed, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, teachers, scientists, writers, editors, and social workers); • Managers and administrators (including all nonretail sales managers); • Owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-employed persons (including farm owners); • Routine white-collar workers (retail sales, clerical, and white-collar service workers); • Skilled workers and foremen in all industries; • Nonskilled workers in all industries (including farming and services); and • Non-full-time labour-force participants (homemakers, retirees, students, and the disabled).
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We have recoded the ANES and Census occupational data for each election to conform to this class scheme. As shown in the table, the relative size of classes has undergone some important changes, with growth in the ranks of professionals and managers but some shrinkage in the nonskilled working class, and a large decline in the non-working segment of the population (those working less than 20 hours per week). Our analysis of religious groups focuses on denominational membership, given the lack of adequate doctrinal measures before 1980 in the ANES series. We distinguish between Catholics, Jews, those with no religion, minor 'other' religions, and three categories of Protestant denominations which we label 'conservative', 'moderate', and 'liberal' (following the schema developed by Stark and Glock, 1968 and Lopatto, 1985; see Manza and Brooks, 1997 for further details). US, 1995; NES6092: NstomeJEJxtiom StKJw, 1960 Microdita. 1960 Microdita. ,1970 Microdita. ,1980 Microdita. , and 1990 Censua Public Use Microdati Samples.
Measuring the Impact of Social Groups on Party Coalitions
Our preceding discussion identified groupspecific voter alignments, size, and turnout rates as the key factors governing the impact of social groups on party coalitions. Given our focus on major party coalitions, our primary goal is to estimate the number of Democratic voters amongst major social groups as a proportion of all Democratic voters in a given election, and to develop the same estimates for the Republican coalition. By comparing changes in these estimates, we gauge the evidence for trends in the social group composition of the two major parties.
The measure of group impacts on party coalitions that we develop uses estimates of group-specific alignment, size, and turnout rate. Our point of departure is a measure used by Stanley and Niemi (1993) in their analysis of partisanship. We formalize this measure of group impacts on party coalitions (y /t ) in equation 1, where/= 1 for Democratic and 2 for Republican voters at election /. We refer to equation 1 as 'initial' because it ignores group-specific differences in turnout rates. Instead, the calculation of this index requires only that we know the predicted probability that the /fcth group will favour the / major party (P/&), the size of the kth group at election /as a sample proportion 17 (X&), and the sample size (N) of the dataset for election /.
(1)
Predicted group-specific voting alignments can be obtained readily from a logistic regression model of vote choice, and the other quantities are unproblematic (additional details are discussed below). This index has, however, two important limitations: in addition to ignoring group differences in turnout, it takes as given the sample distribution for the social group variables in the ANES.
We improve on these limitations by using the 'corrected' index summarized by equation 2. The lefthand side of the equation is unchanged, as are the reference to group-specific alignments and sample size:
However, in contrast to equation 1, equation 2 incorporates a correction for group size using Census data (/ifc,), 18 and an additional parameter for group-specific turnout rates (Ptmi), where m = 1 for voters and 0 otherwise (again for the/feth social group at election i). To calculate this index, we must also estimate the additional parameter for group-specific turnout rates. Once we have attained all the necessary estimates, we can then calculate the impact of the social groups in the analyses for each election. These calculations represents the predicted proportion of a particular group amongst all Democratic or Republican voters (at a given election). By comparing the latter proportion with the corresponding figure for group size, we can thus gauge the over-or under-representation of that group within each coalition.
Analyses
Changes in Group Political Alignments
In the first column of Table 2 , we present the coefficients and standard errors for our preferred model of group-specific political alignments in presidential elections between 1960 and 1992. 19 In the nine remaining columns of the table, we present the predicted probabilities of favouring the Democratic over the Republican candidate for each group in the 1960 through 1992 elections.
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These results provide a systematic portrait of the patterns of continuity and change in group-specific voting alignments over the past three decades (see Brooks and Manza, 1997a for further details). However, our main interest in this study lies instead in using the predicted probabilities to calculate the impact of social groups on party coalitions. To this end we use the nine columns of predicted probabilities for our subsequent calculations (presented below).
Changes in Group-Specific Turnout
Before calculating group-specific turnout rates, we must first establish a preferred model of social groups and voter turnout during the 1960-92 period. In Table 3 , we present fit statistics with which to evaluate a series of competing models of group-specific turnout rates.
21 Model 1 includes main effects for the independent variables in the analyses (and also interaction effects for gender-by-cohort).
22 This model provides a baseline for comparing subsequent models. Model 2 readily improves over the fit of model 1, providing clear evidence for a lasting change in voter turnout among African-Americans after I960. Model 6 does not improve the fit of model 4, providing no evidence for class-specific trends in voter turnout. Similarly, model 7 does not improve the fit of model 4, providing no evidence of genderspecific trends in turnout. However, model 8 provides evidence for a significant race-by-religion interaction. 25 The comparison between models 8 and 9 favours model 8 according to the BIC index, but model 9 using the -2 log-likelihood statistic (the 0.04^>-value for the -2 log-likelihood statistic is just under the conventional 0.05 level of significance for the chi-square test). We were unable to find an 'intermediate' model including some of the interactions parameterized in model 9, and on grounds of parsimony, we thus side with the BIC result and choose model 8 as our preferred model of group-specific voter turnout.
26 Table 4 presents the coefficients from our preferred model of group-specific turnout rates in presidential elections. These coefficients reveal many large differences in voter turnout amongst social groups. For example, unskilled workers are the least likely class to vote, while conservative Protestants and those with 'no religion' have the lowest "Data in this and subsequent tables arc from the National Election Studies, 1960-1992.The dependent variable ncodcd'l'ifa respondent reports voting, and ' 0* otherwise.
Region is coded ' 1' for non-South, and ' 0* for residence in the South. participation rates among all religious groups. As before, our primary interest lies with using the model's coefficients to calculate group-specific turnout rates. Columns 2 to 10 present the predicted probabilities we use in our calculations of the impact of the four social groups on party coalitions. Each group thus has a (predicted) probability of voting in a given election, and differences between these probabilities lead to differential impacts of social groups on the two party coalitions.
The Impact of Social Groups on Party Coalitions
We can now use the estimates developed in the preceding sections to calculate the impact of social groups on party coalitions. The estimates for the Democratic coalition are presented in Table 5 , and the estimates for the Republican coalition are presented in Table 6 (we discuss these results in tandem for each group in the analyses). The estimates in the first nine columns of Table 5 are the predicted proportion of group-specific voters amongst all Democratic voters; the net change in this proportion between 1960 and 1992 is presented in the tenth and final column as a summary measure of change during the time period under investigation. Table 6 provides the corresponding estimates for the Republican Party. All estimates sum to 100 for a given cleavage, and by observing both the relative size of an estimate for a specific group as well as the change in this size for the nine elections, we can thus observe the (changing) contribution of a group to the Democratic (or Republican) coalition. The results for racial groups provide clear evidence of significant change in the Democratic but not the Republican coalition. Over time, AfricanAmerican voters have increased their presence in the Democratic coalition, exceeding their relative size in the population after 1960. Not surprisingly, in elections in which the Democratic candidate has fared poorly, the exceptional loyalty of AfricanAmerican voters results in their massive over-representation within the Democratic coalition (e.g. 20 per cent in 1980). However, our results also show that the exceptionally strong alignment of AfricanAmerican voters with the Democratic Party after 1960 has resulted in their over-representation even in elections involving Democratic victories (e.g. 17 per cent in both 1976 and 1992). Because we measure racial group membership as a dichotomy, the nonblack results are simply the mirror image, with non-black voters representing no more than roughly 80 per cent of the Democratic coalition after 1972. ofgroup-specific voter turnout in presidential elections, 1960-1992 (N = 14,068)
Independent variables
Coeff.
• The impact of racial group memberships on the Republican coalition contrasts sharply, showing an impressive degree of stability. African-American voters have never represented more than 3 per cent of GOP presidential voters, and have in fact constituted no more than 1 per cent since 1960. Shifts in size and turnout among African-American voters have thus had no impact on their dramatic underrepresentation within the Republican coalition. Taken together, these results for the impact of racial groups on the two parties' coalitions provide evidence for the ongoing importance of race since 1964.
In contrast to the preceding changes, religious group changes are a product not only of shifting alignments, but also of changes in group size (see Table 1 ). Coupled with their weakening Republican alignment, the shrinking number of liberal Protestant voters has reduced their contribution to the Republican coalition by a massive 14 per cent since 1964. Size changes among this group have been partially offset by their shifting alignments (seeTable 2), resulting in a smaller (6 per cent) decline within the Democratic coalition. Moderate Protestants have also experienced declines in membership (seeTable 1), but these changes have had little impact on their presence within either coalition (once we ignore the unusual 1960 election and Catholics' exceptional support for Catholic Democratic candidate John Kennedy). The results for conservative Protestants also reveal little change within the Republican coalition. However, even ignoring the 1960 election, conservative Protestants became a smaller presence within the Democratic coalition during this rime period (ignoring the 1976 and 1980 elections during which rime Baptist Democrat Jimmy Carter enjoyed disproportionate support amongst this segment of the elaborate). 
+1
* Numbers in columns arc the predicted proportion of t row-specific group among all Republican voters in a specific election year Numbers in the last column are the predicted change in these proportions (for a given group) between 1960 and 1992. Predicted proportions do not all sum to 100 due to rounding error. Change* in the net impact of religious groups on the Democratic coalition are calculated for 1964 vs 1992 (due to the unusually high degree of support given to Democratic candidate John Kennedy in I960). c Eiduding self-employed professionals.
With regard to non-Protestant religious groups, the religious group bases of the major party coaliCatholic voters have experienced some asymmetri-tions. Given significant differences in religious cal changes, growing in size within the Republican group representation within each coalition (see the coalition but maintaining a relatively constant pre-final columns in both Tables 5 and 6), it is important sence within the Democratic coalition (again not to overstate this trend. Nevertheless, the declinignoring the 1960 election). Of the remaining three ing presence of liberal Protestants within each religious groups, the residual group for 'other' reli-coalition, coupled with the growing presence of gions shows little change and represents a small those with no religion (amidst an increase in Cathopresence within each party coalition. Jewish voters lie voters within the Republican coalition), indicates have also constituted a small portion of each coali-some convergence in the overall impact of the relition, but whereas their presence has been largely gious cleavage. unchanged among Republican voters, their presence
The relative positions of classes within the two in the Democratic coalition has declined in tandem party coalitions have undergone important changes with their shrinking numbers in the population. since 1960. Although professionals have grown as a Finally, steady increases in size among those voters proportion of the labour force, their + 3 per cent with no religion has increased their presence within growth in the Republican coalition differs little both the Republican (+ 5 per cent) and Democratic from their 4 per cent overall growth during this (+ 10 per cent) coalitions. Taken as a whole, these same period (see Table 1 ). However, professionals' results provide evidence of growing similarity in increasing tendency to favour Democratic presidential candidates has made them a somewhat larger presence in that party's coalition (showing a net predicted increase of 6 per cent between 1960 and 1992). The reverse pattern is observed for managers, who have experienced a 10 per cent increase in the Republican coalition, but a smaller (5 per cent) increase in the Democratic coalition. While both coalitions have become more oriented towards professionals and managers, Democratic gains have come disproportionately from professionals, and Republican gains from managers.
Our results for the self-employed show little change for either coalition. The self-employed have experienced a large shift in alignment, a result that can be observed in the -0.56 coefficient (seeTable 2) representing a Republican voting trend among this class since the 1980 election. However, their slight decline in size has offset this change.
Routine white-collar employees have increased in size, resulting in a 3 per cent increase within the Democratic coalition and a 1 per cent increase in the Republican coalition. While skilled workers' presence within the Democratic coalition remains largely unchanged, earlier reductions in their level of Democratic loyalty have resulted in a 3 per cent increase within the Republican coalition. For their part, nonskilled workers have experienced a drop in the Democratic coalition which stems from declines in both size and Democratic loyalty. The residual non-full-time labour force category exhibits a large (8 per cent) decline within the Democratic coalition, and an even larger (16 per cent) drop within the Republican coalition. Changes in the size of this heterogeneous group (consisting primarily of housewives, retirees, and students) account for part of these shifts. However, it is the growing level of participation of women in the workforce, and especially the changing political alignment of this group (see Manza and Brooks, 1998) , that accounts for the disproportionate change within the Republican coalition. Taken together, changes in the class composition of party coalitions show a modest trend towards convergence, given that the disproportionate decline in non-labour-force members •within the Republican coalition has been more than offset by the growing presence of both professionals and managers within the Democratic and Republican coalitions.
Since 1960, the impact of gender shows only the most minute of changes for both the Democratic and Republican coalitions. Initially, this result may appear paradoxical, given the well-known emergence of a gender gap in presidential elections. However, the earlier findings relating to the nonworking segment of the population provide the explanation, given that the gender gap is itself a product of class-related factors. More specifically, this gap in vote choice is produced by the growing number of working women -a group that has been in a Democratic alignment in the post-World War II era (see Manza and Brooks, 1998) . Accordingly, once this process is measured in a multivariate model of vote choice (seeTable 2), there is no trend in the political alignments of women versus men or in the impact of gender on party coalitions up to 1992.
Discussion
This paper has outlined an approach to studying changes in the impact of major social groups on party coalitions, and applied it to U.S. presidential elections between the 1960s and the 1990s. Our measures derive from multivariate models that properly measure group-specific political alignments and voter turnout (as well as over-time changes in these rates), while also employing corrections for group size. Previous studies have all failed to address at least one (and often more than one) of these potential sources of error. Some of our results provide corroboration for predictions made in earlier studies, including the growing importance of African-Americans and the declining contribution of working-class voters to the Democratic coalition. Predictably, the exceptional loyalty of AfricanAmerican voters results in this segment of the electorate being substantially over-represented when Democratic candidates do poorly among all voters.
Our analyses also deliver a series of new findings about major social groups within party coalitions. For the Democrats, perhaps the biggest surprise is the growth of professional voters in their electoral coalition. Professionals were twice as numerous among all Democratic voters in 1992 as they were in 1960. Nonskilled workers have over time become a smaller presence, so that their relative size within the Democratic coalition is very similar to that of professionals in the 1988 and 1992 elections. The growth of managers within the Democratic coalition is also noteworthy, given their long-standing Republican alignment (see Table 2 ). These results underscore the importance of group-size changes, as well as the measurement of class using suitable multi-category schemes (a problem affecting past studies of party coalitions).
The importance of changes in group size, in combination with changing alignments, is also apparent in examining the religious cleavage. The declining size of liberal Protestants has resulted in a smaller presence within the Democratic coalition, but coupled with the dramatic weakening of their earlier Republican alignment results in a much smaller presence within the latter's electoral coalition. This result has not been anticipated by past studies of the religious cleavage because this research has not systematically analysed the dual factors of size and alignment shifts. Also of note for religious groups is the stable presence of Catholics within the Democratic coalition, a result that becomes apparent once we take into account the unusual nature of the 1960 Presidential election.
The main social sources of change in the Republican coalition involve liberal Protestants, Catholics, professionals, and managers. As discussed earlier, liberal Protestants constitute a dramatically smaller percentage of the Republican coalition, while Catholics have increased their presence. Despite a shift in alignment away from the Republican Party, professionals have grown slightly within the Republican coalition, while managers have increased their presence more dramatically. During this time, the gender composition of the Republican Party's coalition has experienced little change, once we take into account the growth in the number of working women in the electorate. Nevertheless, the Party has experienced disproportionate losses among non-working voters, and many female members of this group have changed their status by entering the labour force as working women.
These results provide evidence of a modest yet significant convergence in the impact of social groups on US party coalitions. Despite a number of important group-specific changes, the underlying political alignments of social groups with the two parties reveal patterns of overall stability (see Brooks and Manza 1997a) . Our analyses here also show no evidence of a declining association between group membership and voter turnout. Instead, it is the third factor in our analyses -group size -that has generated a degree of convergence in the Democratic and Republican coalitions. 27 These modest trends towards convergence, however, have taken place amidst a broader pattern of persistent (and for racial groups, increasing) social group impacts on party coalitions. More specifically, we find that changes in size, turnout, and group-specific political alignments have maintained (while partially reconstituting) the majority of group-based differences in the two parties'coalitions.
Although there are clearly numerous sources of constraints on the policy platforms and activities pursued by political parties, the significance of social group-based differences in their support among voters should not be discounted (cf. Petrocik, 1987) . Our results reveal not only the electoral dependence of each party on recognizable social constituencies, but that this dependence continues to give the Democratic and Republican parties a recognizable public identity, albeit one that is undergoing important changes. Our results also underscore the importance of group-specific turnout to these processes, given that a party that disregards its major group supporters -orattempts to distance itself from its main policy platformsruns the risk of discouraging these supporters from turning out to vote.
Taken as a whole, the analyses presented in this paper provide evidence for the utility of a sociological approach to political behaviour which goes beyond examination of the alignments of social groups. An approach of the sort we have outlined here calls attention to the important role of demographic changes in the size of major groups, and differences in turnout rates, as a necessary supplement to the core questions ofgroupalignments that have longanimated researchers. When supplemented with information about voter alignments, our approach makes possible a broader understanding of the impact of social divisions on electoral contests.
Notes
1. One exception to the point made in this paragraph can be found in the work of his colleagues (1985,1991) on British party coalitions.
2. In this paper we follow American convention in using the phrase 'party coalitions' to refer to the coalitions of different groups of voters from whom political parties receive support, as opposed to die coalitions formed between different parties to form a government after an election in a multi-party system. 3. See Charles and Grusky (1997) for clarification of this distinction. 4. Our analyses build from our earlier investigation (see Brooks and Manza 1997a) of the political alignments of major social groups in the U.S. In that study, our theoretical focus was on group-based political alignments, leading us to employ 'margin-independent' measures. For the current study, we use these estimates of group-specific alignments as one of the key components (in conjunction with group size and turnout estimates) in our analysis of the impact of social groups on party coalitions. 5. The American party system has some unique institutional features in comparison with European systems. Perhaps most notably, two parties (the Democratic and Republican parties) dominate U.S. politics, and elections produce comparatively low rates of voter participation (for example, 50-55% turnout rates in recent Presidential elections). 6. One crucial difference between partisanship and voting analyses is the treatment of independents. In elections, it is useful to note that independents are forced to chose between actual candidates, and those choices shape the structure of party coalitions and determine outcomes (cf. Keith etal., 1992) . Erikson et al. (1989: 338-339) offer an elegant defence of the importance of treating voting, as opposed to party identification, as the ultimate object of investigation in the study of party coalitions. They argue that (1) ongoing changes in party identification provide little help in understanding recent Republican electoral successes; (2) many groups, most notably Southern Democrats, cast ballots that often diverge significantly from their party identification; and (3) presidential and congressional voting patterns typically precede changes in party identification. The measures used in this paper take into account the changing popularity of parties, which in turn affects the relative significance (or insignificance) of a particular group's vote by changing the overall size of the party^ coalition.
7. Niemi's (1993, 1995) important work on group contributions to party coalitions goes beyond the use of exclusive group definitions by estimating a series of multivariate models of partisanship that attempt to control for overlapping group memberships. The main innovation of these authors is to use coefficients from multivariate models of social groups and party identification to derive estimates of (changes in) the impact of group membership. As discussed in detail below, we adopt such a multivariate approach in this study, treating vote choice as our dependent variable, but go beyond Stanley and Niemi to take into account corrections for group she and turnout rates in our subsequent calculations. 8. The important role of turnout underscores our earlier point about conceptualizing party coalitions as relating to vote choice. Because partisanship is unaffected by voter turnout, it necessarily ignores the impact of group differences in levels of political participation. This is an especially critical limitation for understanding the changing impact of many major social groups, given, for instance, the well-known patterns of change in turnout rates amongst women and African-American voters. 9. This tripartite definition of 'social cleavage' builds upon the classic contribution of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) , who argue that the analyses of cleavages should be rooted in social structure, and Bartolini and Mair (1990: chap. 9) , who have developed an elegant theorization of the normative and organizational components of cleavage structures. These approaches can be contrasted with analysts like Dahl (1966) , Allardt and Pesonen (1967) , Rae and Taylor (1970), and Zuckerman (1982) , who have used the term 'cleavage' to apply more broadly to all enduring electoral divisions within a political order. So long as the researcher can distinguish between divisions rooted in social groups and segments of the electorate defined by their differences in policy preferences or ideological orientations, these two conceptualizations are consistent with one another.
10. Less widely studied than black/white differences have been other minority groups, notably Latinos and Asian Americans (but see e.g. DeSipio, 1996) . Both groups have grown significantly in size in recent decades (although more slowly as a proportion of the electorate). However, because of the very low numbers of Latinos and Asian Americans in the ANES data, we do not attempt to estimate changes in the gap between these groups and whites in the time period under investigation. 11. Two main approaches to examining the relationship between religious group membership and political behaviour can be found in the literature: (1) approaches which emphasize divisions arising out of religious denominational membership; and (2) approaches emphasizing doctrinal differences, e.g. cleavages between those who believe in the inerrancy of the Bible versus those who do not believe the Bible to be literally true (Manza and Brooks, 1997; Layman, 1997) . Because limitations of the ANES data before 1980 make systematic evaluations of doctrinal differences impossible, we concentrate on denominational differences in this study. 12. A separate analysis presented elsewhere (see Manza and Brooks, 1999: chap. 9 ) examines the social bases of the major third-paxty candidates (George Wallace, John Anderson, and H. Ross Perot) during this period. 13. The ANES includes two sets of weights for most presidential election year surveys: a time-series weight and a post-stratification weight (available in later surveys). We found, in practice, that neither of these sets of weights were sufficient to fully correct for the overor under-representation of several key groups in the analyses. To take just one example, the unweighted sample proportion of African American voters in 1960 is 0.079 (taking into account missing values on the variables in our analysis). The time-series weight raises this proportion to 0.082, still well below the 0.11 figure from Census data. While these relatively small discrepancies are generally irrelevant to research questions that use margin-independent measures, they have a much larger impact in the current study, given that group size is a factor that directly (and by theoretical design) affects our calculations.
14. The ANES employs a three-digit occupational scheme identical to the Census DOT codes, with periodic changes in the ANES scheme corresponding to changes in the Census codes. Because we have coded them identically, comparability is insured. 15. We utilize occupation rather than income to generate the class map on the grounds that it is the source rather than amount of income which is crucial for defining class location (cf. HoutitaJ., 1993). Heathet al. employ a five-category schema, similar to the one utilized here except that professionals and managers are grouped together in a class they refer to as the 'salariat ' (cf. Brint, 1994; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992 ; for an explicit defence of collapsing professionals and managers into one group, see Goldthorpe, 1995: 319-322) . We maintain a distinction between professionals and managers on the grounds that their conditions of work and mobility chances differ considerably from one another (see e.g. Hout and Hauser, 1992) .
16. Prior to 1960, the ANES did not distinguish among Protestant denominations. Between 1960 and 1972, the ANES offered only limited information about Protestants, most crucially failing to distinguish between Northern and Southern Baptists, and failing to distinguish among other broad denominational families (e.g. Presbyterians). Many scholars have expressed concerns about the available denominational categories in the early years of the series (e.g. Kellstedt and Green, 1993) , and we are not unmindful of these limitations of the data. Nevertheless, our seven-category measure of the religious cleavage is finer-grained than many analyses using the ANES series, and we have no a priori reason to believe it ignores additional politically relevant differences among religious groups. 17. The k sample proportions in the analysis sum to 1.0; thus, we can calculate in turn the impart of the subgroups comprising each of the/cleavages. Note that we have used interpolations to derive the figures for elections occurring between the 1960,1970,1980, and 1990 Censuses. We also used a single extrapolation to derive the 1992 means. 18. Strictly speaking, the Census figures for group size are themselves sample estimates (derived from the Public Use Microdata samples), but we use the familiar n notation for the population parameters to distinguish them from the ANES sample proportions. 19. As noted earlier, we use our earlier preferred model (see Brooks and Manza, 1997a) of the relationship between social cleavages and presidential vote choice as our point of departure in calculating group-specific voter alignments. In that study, we presented a detailed comparison of the fit of a series of competing models of change in the relationship between cleavages and vote choice. 20. Our calculation of these predicted probabilities directly reflects our theoretical focus on political alignments stemming from membership in a specific social group (such as the nonskilled working class) net of the political effects of other, contingencyrelated group memberships (such as race or gender). We thus calculate these probabilities for a given group holding constant respondents' memberships of other social groups, as well as their region of residence and levels of age and education. This procedure contrasts with Stanley and Niemi( 1993) analysis, which did not hold these other covariates constant, thereby not controlling for the partially overlapping effects of social group memberships. Our procedure yields better estimates of the effect of a group's political alignments on party coalitions, and rather than weighting the predicted probability for a particular group (e.g. African-Americans) by their other group characteristics (religion, class, gender, region, education, or age), we hold these constant at pre-set levels. The baseline levels we use in the analyses are: white, Catholic, non-working, men living outside the South that are at the ANES sample means of age (45.57) and education (11.95). 21. We choose a preferred model using both the -2 loglikelihood statistic and the BIC index of fit. Model choice is identical using these two measures of fit, with a single exception (discussed below). 22. This interaction effect measures the persistently low turnout rates of women who became adults in the period before the 19th Amendment of the US Constitution (see Firebaugh and Chen, 1995) . We measure this cohort effect as a dichotomous variable, coded '1' for respondents born prior to 1901, and '0' otherwise. Note that deleting this parameter results in a significantly worse fit for the model using both the -2 log-likelihood test and BIC (see note c); thus we retain it in this and all subsequent models.
23. The lack of improvement in model 3's fit shows, however, that there is no evidence for additional racespecific trends in turnout. 24. The lack of improvement in model 5's fit provides no evidence for additional religious group-specific trends in turnout. 25. More specifically, the -2 log-likelihood statistic selects model 8 over model 4, with the BIC index score of 1 also indicating positive evidence favouring model 8. Note that the interaction effect in question is constrained to apply equally to all three Protestant groups (i.e. these three groups are treated as a single, homogeneous category). As shown in Table 4 , the coefficient for this interaction is large and positive (0.60 (s.e. = 0.19)), indicating that membership in any of the three Protestant groups substantially raises Black voter turnout -a result consistent with the results of research on the critical role of the Black church in political mobilization and protest activity (see Morris 1984) .
26. We note that the potential risk of over-estimating group-specific differences in turnout is far greater with model 9, given that it includes an additional 59 coefficients in comparison to model 8. 27. The absence of a universal pattern of dealignment in social group support for the two major parties, coupled with the evidence of a small trend towards similar party coalitions, again illustrates the importance of distinguishing between research questions about group-based political alignments versus group impacts on party coalitions. Likewise, the multivariate results of this study demonstrate how the political alignment of specific social groups can remain stable in the face of convergence in party coalitions.
